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JUSTICE.
The simplest ideas are sometimes the most diffi-
cult ones to define ; and the words which are com-
monly and daily used as catchwords for all parties
and for all opinions are, as a rule, vague and undeter-
mined. Yet most of these words denote in their proper
meaning very important ideas, which form essential
parts of our souls, keeping our hearts and minds well
tuned and in good harmony with the welfare of our
aspiring, toiling, advancing fellow-men.
As such catchwords have been used, for instance,
the words "Liberie, egalite, fraternite !" and they were
made to mask the fiercest and crudest terrorism of
modern times. Other catchwords of a similarly de-
lusive nature are Reform, Morality, Goodness, Truth,
and Justice. Unless these words have a very clear
and definite meaning they are at best mere phrases,
not unlike a sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal.
But, as a rule, they ar_e worse than that : they either
actually are or are very apt to become treacherous
will-o'-the-wisps, destined to lead the most well-inten-
tioned minds astray.
Let us not rest satisfied with such catchwords,
however beautiful they may sound, without properly
understanding their meanings ; for if we understand
the true meanings of these words, we shall not so easily
be blinded by a wrong application of them.
* *
Justice may briefly be defined as "giving every
one his due ;" but this definition does not include the
measure according to which we can determine what
and how much is due to the various persons to whom
justice shall be done, and this very same definition
may be adopted by two opposite parties, each of whom
contends that they are fighting for justice.
There are two things implied in the definition of
justice as "giving to every one his due," which have
to be minded, and a consideration of which will help
us to clear away some of our doubts :
F"irst, that justice is a virtue which can exist only
in a community of social beings having some important
interests, aims, and rules of conduct in common.
And secondly, that justice means equality of rule
under unequal conditions ; it means equal measures
for equal dues and unequal measures for unequa
dues.
Justice is a virtue of social beings. For we can-
not give any one his due, unless we have dealings with
him, partaking of the nature of a cooperation
; unless
we are somehow or other allied or engaged in pursu-
ing a common purpose ; unless ^e are in some social
relation to each other, so that he has rendered us
goods, services, or assistance of some kind, ft is,
therefore, a very hard thing, indeed it is impossible to
establish the idea of justice purely upon the basis of
an extreme individualism. He who regards society as
a mere aggregate of individuals can see in justice only
the right of everybody to the result of his labors.
Yet "right" and " justice " are not identical.
Taking the one-sided individualistic view, Mr.
Spencer, in his book "Justice," entirely neglects the
fact that the ver}' essence of justice is bound up in the
social relations of man, and that without these social
relations there is no sense in employing the term "jus-
tice." Thus Mr. Spencer discusses in his book various
rights of living beings but not justice.
Mr. Spencer speaks of
"... .The law that benefits received shall be directly propor-
tionate to merits possessed : merits being measured by power of
self-sustentation." (P. 6, chap. .Vnimal Ethics).
"That the individual shall experience all the consequences,
good and evil, of its own nature and consequent conduct, which is
that primary principle of sub-human justice whence results sur-
vival of the fittest, is, in creatures that lead solitary lives, a prin-
ciple complicated only by the responsibilities of parenthood." (P.
13, chap. Sub-human Justice).
"Sub-human justice becomes more decided as organisation
becomes higher." (P. 10, chap. Sub-human Justice.)
" Sub-human justice is extremely imperfect in detail,"
because
"Accidents of kinds which fall indiscriminately upon inferior
and superior individuals." (P. 10).
Mr. Spencer apparently regards it as an act of jus-
tice that the swallow gets the flies he catches, and the
bear the honey he hunts for; while "the multitudi-
nous deaths caused by the inclemencies of weather"
are such imperfections in the system of justice as will
be overcome in the further advance of evolution.
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But to keep all that which one can get, is at best
a "right," not "justice"; and suffering through un-
) favorable conditions is not "injustice," but "acci-
dent" !
The whole gist of the book is contained in the
sentence :
"Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he
infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."
Of "human justice" Mr. Spencer says:
"Each individual ought to receive the benefits and the evils
of his own nature and consequent conduct : neither being pre-
vented from having whatever good his actions normally bring to
him, nor allowed to shoulder off on to other persons whatever ill
is brought to him by his actions." ( P. 17. chap. Human Justice.)
This is explained as follows :
"When, of some one who suffers a disaster, it is said— 'He
has no one to blame but himself,' there is implied the belief that
he has not been inequitably dealt with." (P. 18, chap. Human
Justice.)
"A kindred conviction is implied when, conversely, there re-
sults good instead of evil." ( P. 18, chap. Human Justice.)
"Similarly is it with the civilised varieties of mankind as
compared with the savage varieties. A still further diminished
rate of mortality implies that there is a still larger proportion, the
members of which gain good from well-adapted acts and suffer
evil from ill-adapted acts." (P. 19, chap. Human Justice.)
If that is the nature of justice, we ought to speak
of injustice whenever a hard-working and virtuous
man is killed in a railroad accident.
Mr. Spencer, in our conception, makes an errone-
ous start. He mentions things which have little or
nothing to do with the subject of his title. He fre-
quently uses the word, but he never touches the real
problem of justice. Limiting his inquiry on the funda-
mental conception of justice to the justice of nature
toward her creatures, he does not appear to be aware
of the fact that this usage of the word is allowable
only as a poetical license.
When claiming that the term "justice" must be
restricted to individuals living in communities, we do
by no means restrict it to human society. Animals
that lead a social life exercise justice, according to the
perfection attained in their societies, as much as man
does, and often with great cruelty. When bees no
longer allow drones to partake of the common stock of
food, because they have ceased to be able to render
useful services to the hive, they commit an act of jus-
tice ; it may be severe, it may be unfair, it may even
be unjust according to the standard of human justice
;
but it is, nevertheless, an act analogous to human jus-
tice.
Mr. Spencer confounds right (viz.: the right of
power, the ability of holding one's own, the faculty of
self sustentation) with justice.
We may say that every creature has a right to re-
ceive such benefits as are directly proportionate to its
merits, their merits being the power to take their ben-
efits. In this sense we speak of the inalienable rights
of rnen to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
but scarcely of justice.
A tiger who hunts down a fat deer lias a right to
the fat deer, but we cannot call it unjust that some
fellow tiger hunts down with ten times more trouble a
lean deer. Granting that both have a right to what-
ever they get, what shall we say of the lion who, after
a square and honest fight, despoils both tigers of their
righteous possessions ? And, granting that all men have
the inalienable rights which they assert, why do not
all sentient creatures (as the Buddhists actually claim)
enjoy the very same rights. No doubt they may claim
them, if they can, and if they can assert them, their
title is as good as that of the citizens of the United
States, who, rightly or wrongly, base upon it their dec-
laration of independence.
We can speak of justice only because of the in-
equality in the world, in the face of which an inequal-
ity of attitude is demanded. Justice is equality of rule
for an inequality of single cases.
Justice means giving to everyone his due rewards
for merits, and taking away rewards or punishing for
demerits. We do justice to a great man in honoring
him. The employer does justice to his employee in
paying him the full value of his work, and the crimi-
nal receives justice at the hands of the sheriff.
Such is justice. Yet the man who earns a thousand
dollars by a lucky circumstance, say by the fluctuating
prices in the market of certain commodities, or by an
unforeseen rise in real estate, without any merit on his
part, has a perfect and undisputed right to retain it,
but his gain is not founded on justice ; his gain is
only in so far connected with justice as he is entitled
to keep it ; he would suffer injustice if he were, in a
high-handed way, deprived of it.
*
* *
It is peculiarly characteristic of Mr. Spencer's he-
donism that he regards those rights which are not con-
ducive to happiness as unessential and even illusory.
He speaks of political rights as "rights so called." He
says :
"Those shares of political power which in the more advanced
nations citizens have come to possess, and which experience has
shown to be good guaranties for the maintenance of life, liberty,
and property, are spoken of as though the claims to them were of
the same nature as the claims to life, liberty, and property them-
selves. Yet there is no kinship between the two. The giving of a
vote, considered in itself, in no way furthers the voter's life, as
does the exercise of those various liberties we properly call rights."
We citizens of a republic regard our political rights
as a sacred possession. Many of us neglect them when
and because their exercise becomes inconvenient. But
we propose, nevertheless, to preserve them even though
they should not bring us any returns in happiness and
property. With all the faults that vitiate our politics,
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who among us would be so base as to prefer the greater
ease of being comfortably governed, to the troubles of
democratic institutions ? And if anyone among us were
base enough to think so, he would pay the tribute to
virtue which is called hypocrisy and be ashamed to
openly speak his mind.
Mr. Spencer regards political rights as mere ends
to secure our claims on life, liberty, and property. He
says :
" Current political thought is profoundly vitiated by this mis-
taking of means for ends, and by this pursuit of the means to the
neglect of the ends. Hence, among others, the illusions which
prevail concerning 'political rights.'
"There are no further rights, truly so called, than such as
have been set forth. ... If a man's freedom is not in any way fur-
ther restricted, he possesses all his rights."
Our ethical criterion is not the greatest happiness
of the greatest number, but the fullest and richest and
highest evolution of the human soul. The possession
of our political rights are not mere means to an end
in the sense that Mr. Spencer suggests. It is doubtful
whether we can speak of anything as an end itself.
"Life, liberty, and property" at least are not less
" means to an end " than " political rights." Property,
above all, is most assuredly not an end, and the polit-
ical rights of any advanced nation ought to be holier
even than property and life. This has been a sacred
tradition in the home of Mr. Spencer and we intend to
preserve it here in the new world. Our political rights
are as yet imperfect, but we shall not abandon them
for the sole reason that they need improvement.
*
* *
Mr. Salter, in his article on "Justice," recognises
equality and inequality as two ingredients of the idea
of justice, but his treatment is different from ours.
He expatiates on the equality of all men, "having in
mind their essential humanit)', those capacities that
lead us to differentiate them from the rest of the world
and call them men." Justice, accordingly, is to Mr.
Salter "nothing but that action which is inspired by
equal regard for all men." The equality of justice, in
our opinion, consists in the equality of principle or
law or rule of conduct ; while the inequality consists
in the inequality of the persons to whom justice is
meted out. The equality of men, which, in so far as
all men are rational beings cannot be denied, is unduly
exaggerated by Mr. Salter. Admitting that inequalities
exist, he says :
"But all such inequalities are, as compared with the great
underlying capacities which men have in common, on the surface."
This is not so. The inequalities are not superficial,
but essential, and justify, therefore, in the place of
" an equal regard " an extraordinary and often a rad-
ical inequality of conduct. Without these inequalities,
there would be no justice, no discrimination of con-
duct, but simply indiscriminate equality.
It is a very common mistake to identify justice
with equality. Especially the social reformers who
clamor most vehemently for justice, frequently demand
nothing but equality.
Those who preach that the laborer alone produces
values, and that a fortune can be amassed onl}' by
fleecing the laborer of his dues, (taking the ground
that the whole profit ought to be equally divided among
those who do manual work,) are blind to the value of
intellectual work. And the most valuable work (most
valuable to society) does not as yet consist in the
lucubrations of the professor in his study, but in be-
ing the practical leader of some enterprise, the think-
ing head of an industrial organism, the independent
captain, on whose vigilance and ability depends the
undisturbed livelihood of all those who have embarked
with him in the same venture.
A man who starts an enterprise risks his fortune,
but when successful he creates new values which did
not exist before. Mankind is that much richer through
his efforts. Having an attentive eye for the rise of a want
he supplies the means to satisf}' the want ; and in doing
so he cannot but help creating new wants, which serve
in turn as stimuli for further enterprises. Such a man
deserves the full share of his industrious activity and
ingenious attention. The capital earned in this way
will be in good hands, for it is most probable that he
will be the best man to take care of it : he will use it
where it will bring the best returns and work most
advantageously for a further production or increase
of values. On the other hand, it is the duty of this
man, and in the long nm it is also to his own advantage,
to pay the men to whom he gives employment some-
thing more than the rate of wages which they could
make independently of him.
The full rate of wages which employees could make
independently of their employer is their due, and, in-
deed, it is exactly the amount which they can and, if
they look out for their own interests, which they will
enforce.
Justice demands that a man who employs men to
help him in his enterprise should give them their full
due, and we say that the wages due to them 'is the
price which they can enforce : this is for the average
laborer that amount which he could realise either in
the employ of others or by independent work ; and
for extraordinarily skilful workmen or artisans it is
that sum which represents to the employer the value
of their assistance in his enterprise. An employer, if
just, will gladly pay those employees proportionately
higher wages through whose assistance the returns of
his capital are greater.
The statement concerning the dues of the average
workman, however, needs a supplementary explana-
tion. We do not call those wages just, which are paid
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by taking advantage of temporary emergencies of the
men seeking for employment. There are many indus-
trial plants that cut down the pay of the laborer to the
starvation point. They are parasitic institutions, para-
sitic to society at large. If all the employers acted in
this way mankind would rapidly degenerate. In order
to defend themselves against extortions the laborers of
the United States have formed unions, which enable
them to fight for their rights more effectually than they
could do alone.
It is further unjust to lock out laborers when, after
having adapted themselves to one special kind of work,
they have become unfit to undertake any other kind (for
this is creating an emergency) ; or when, after having
settled in a community, after having founded families
and acquired homes, they find it very expensive and
also inconvenient, at an advanced age, to begin life
over again in some other town or state, they know not
where. Such lockouts are worse than taking advan-
tage of emergencies, they are creating emergencies.
*
All mankind have one common aim, which is the
enhancement, the enlargement, the growth, and con-
stant reformation of the human soul. The rewards
for the work done in the service of this idea are,
according to the system of society which among
all civilised nations of the world has been found
out by experience to work best, distributed by a free
competition for them. It is no exaggeration to say,
that the more the system of free competition is car-
ried out, the more progressive a nation is. We trust
that the more equal the chances are for every individ-
ual to apply his energies to whatever he thinks him-
self fittest to do, the better work will be rendered by
the community as a whole, and the better will be the
returns of the work.
To stimulate the spirit of enterprise and of individ-
ual exertion, society insures to everyone and to his
posterity, (as the heirs of his very existence, consti-
tuting the continuance of his self after death,) the full
benefit of his work performed for the progress of the
race. On the other hand, in order to give as far as
possible equal chances to all in the general competi-
tion, this great republic of ours has instituted the pub-
lic school system, the justice of which is based upon
the idea that the education of the children is of vital
interest to the community as a whole. Justice in-
cludes the performance of duties, and some of the
most important duties are to the generations still un-
born.
The law has decided that a certain portion of the
taxes, without any further discrimination, shall be em-
ployed for the support of the public schools. And we
see no injustice in the fact that the childless bachelor
and also those people who see fit to send their children
to private schools, are obliged to contribute to the
maintenance of an institution from which they do not
directly derive any personal benefits, either for them-
selves or their families, but in which they ought to be
interested as citizens. It is everyone's duty to help
in building up the future of mankind.
It is to be hoped that in time not only the public
schools, but all schools, the colleges, and universities,
also, will become public institutions, affording quite
equal chances of education to the rich and to the poor.
* *
Justice cannot and should not be done arbitrarily
or by guesswork. Accordingly, rules have been devised
to regulate duties, and these rules are called "laws " if
they are of a general nature, and applicable to the whole
community; they are called "contracts," if they are
made by private individuals. A society in which duties
are or can be thus fixed is called a state, and a state,
being the organised common will of the members of a so-
ciety, has the authority as well as the power to enforce
certain duties. A law that is not to be enforced, a con-
tract which the parties are not bound to respect, and a
state that has no power whatever over its members,
are self-contradictory conceptions. There may be and
there are unjust laws, which it is highly desirable to
abolish ; there may be and there are unfair contracts,
in which one party deceives the other ; there may be
and there are states which are not the organised com-
mon will of all citizens, but only of a usurper or of a
ruling class. In such cases we have to work for an
improvement of the laws, of the state, and of the
conditions under which contracts are made, but we
should not for that reason propose (as do extreme in-
dividualists and anarchists) that laws, as such, clearly
defined contracts, and states should not exist at all,
for this proposition, closely considered, is tantamount
not only to a denial of all duties but also to the aboli-
tion of justice itself.
The exact performance of our d.uties according to
laws or contracts, not more and not less, is called jus-
tice. To perform duties precisely as the law or a
contract prescribes, is justice according to the letter
;
and justice is the least that is expected of us. If we
do less we are in default. Justice, in this sense, is of
all virtues the lowest, for its absence denotes a posi-
tive vice. However, when justice is accomplished not
only in the letter but in the spirit of the law, (always
supposing in this case that the law be righteous,) jus-
tice becomes the highest virtue, (as Plato maintains,)
for it comprises all other virtues. Justice is the ful-
filment of the law and the moral ideal of mankind.
*
* *
This consideration leads us to the problems as to
the source and ultimate authority of justice.
The source of justice is morality. Justice is not
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morality, but it is a special application of morality.
The moral man will always be just ; he has such an
attitude toward others that he will, as a matter of
course, be careful to fulfil all the claims they have on
him. Any injustice on his part can only be caused
through an oversight. The just man, however, is not
necessarily a moral man, for he may do justice for other
reasons than from pure good-will. He may, but it is
little probable that a man will, practice justice through-
out his life, unless his character be so attuned toward
the world, that his good actions are simpl}' the ex-
pressions of his kind heart. He will not only be just
when a contract or a law enjoins a certain duty, but
also when equity demands it. There cannot be laws
and regulations for every trifle, but we can attend to
our duties with a good will and love of duty, as if every
detail had been rigorously fixed. The moral attitude
of general good-will (in the language of the gospel
called " love,") prompts us spontaneously and gladly
to perform all justice, and to fulfil the law voluntarily.
The ultimate authority of justice is to be found in
the ordinances of nature ; and the ordinances of
nature are exactly what the theologians call " the will
of God." Justice is but another name for the con-
ditions under which alone, according to the natural
order of the universe, societies can exist. Justice
makes of hordes of wild animals or savages moral com-
munities, and every act of injustice is a breaking down
of the foundations of society.
Let us be most careful in being just, and let us im-
plant the love of justice in our hearts. Thus alone we
can establish upon earth an increasingly more perfect
realisation of the human in man or the kingdom of
heaven (as Christ called the religion he preached).
Justice is the will of God that shall be done, and the
path of justice is the path of progress that leadeth
unto life. p. c.
CURRENT TOPICS.
American humor may be recognised by its breadth, and the
immense distance between the opposite points of it that emphasise
a contrast. When a man complains loudly that he is being cheated
and swindled, and robbed, he does not give us the smallest hint
that there is any comedy in reserve, but when in the middle o£ his
outcry he joins the robbers, and helps them to get away with the
plunder stolen from himself the whole grand larceny is converted
at once into American humor of superior quality. As a fair sample
of the article, I present the following little story, founded on fact.
Last Tuesday Mr. Edward Murphy was elected to the United
States Senate by the legislature of New York, and while the voting
was going on, the name of Mr. Kempner being called, that honor-
able member rose and said, ' ' First, the election of Edward Murphy
is dictated by himself and two or three other persons in utter de-
fiance of public sentiment. Secondly, he is not a statesman either
of high or low degree, and consequently is not fit to represent this
state in the United States Senate." He had just finished "Thirdly,''
and was going on to "Fourthly," when he was called to order,
whereupon he rolled up his indictment, and brought his charges
against Mr. Murphy to a comical anti-climax by voting for that
candidate. This contrast between speech and action is by some
dull, straightforward people called self-stultification, but it is really
American huraor laughing at serious life. Something like it may
be found in English fiction ; as, for instance, in the I'ickwick pa-
pers, where Mr. Blotton calls Mr. Pickwick a humbug, and im-
mediately declares that he has " the highest regard and esteem for
him," but that is merely the absurd creation'of a story teller ; we
give the contradiction life and interest by reducing it to actual
practice in affairs of greatest moment, thereby throwing over them
all a cloak of playful insincerity. I once knew a man who had the
habit of cheating himself when playing solitaire : a stupid sort of
knavery indeed, but better than none at all.
It is not easy to spiritualise larceny, and yet it can be done,
Cardinal Manning put stealing among the elements of social self-
defence, and Judge Springfield of Tennessee puts it on a higher
plane than that. He uses it as a religious warning to wicked cor-
porations, and he sanctions it as a justifiable attempt by the poor
to recover some of the " natural opportunities" which have been
stolen from them by the rich. He announces that "no person in
necessitous circumstances will be punished in his court for stealing
coal from the coal trust " ; and he discharged several men and
women who had been arrested in Chattanooga for stealing coal.
If this dictum is the higher law in Tennessee where the weather
is comparatively mild, it must be the very highest law in Illinois,
supreme above the statutes and the decalogue, especially in Chi-
cago, where the mercury has a habit of creeping do^vn below the
zero point, and staying there. If the code of the Tennessee judge
is morally correct, stealing coal from the trust is a patriotic duty,
and I already feel some twinges of a guilty conscience because I
have not yet stolen any coal this winter from the coal yards. The
higher law of Judge Springfield, is not only ethically bad, but also
it is unsound in social economics. It makes me the judge in my own
cause, deciding that the world owes me a living, and then permits
me as my own sheriff to levy on anybody's property to satisfy the
judgment. Of course, Judge Springfield's doctrine is intended for
cold- weather only, but he will find it thriving in the summer time,
although then it may apply to something else than coal ; and it
comes handy to this argument that an ice trust was organised yes-
terday. The judge is like that man in the Arabian Nights who let
some imps of mischief out of a bo.x, and then saw them grow so
big in a minute that he could not put them back again. Larceny
as a social reformer is not reliable, and I have no confidence in it
;
although I think the confederated larceny committed by the coal
trust is ten thousand times more criminal than the petty counter-
stealing by the poor. I have one religious comfort left ; no mem-
ber of the trust will ever go to heaven. " I haint got to go no
furder than my testyment for that."
In spite of all my efforts to protect the dignity of the greatest
office in this republic from ungrammalical insult, the illegitimate
barbarism "Chief Executive," still usurps the place and majesty
of that lawful, stately, and grammatical designation "Presi-
dent of the United States." Little did I dream when I was fight-
ing for my country, that I should live to see the day when
the President of the United States would be supplanted by the
little, wheezy, epileptic equivocation, " Chief Executive." Merely
as rhetoric, the title "President of the United States " is magnifi-
cent ; and I cannot understand why the American people should
be afraid of it, as if it had the measles or the cholera. Before long,
the Chief Justice of the United States will sink into the "Chief
Judicial " ; and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, will




lative." It's coming to that, and we may as well fortify our minds
to bear the blow. There is no aggravated assault and battery upon
our language that the newspapers are not ready to commit ; and
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even American statesmen, sworn to obey the constitution, are not
to be depended on ; for no longer ago than yesterday, a statesman
in the Senate o£ Illinois offered a resolution of which the preamble
was, "Whereas, we have learned of the death of Rutherford B.
Hayes, who for four years filled the high ofBce of chief executive
of this nation." As there is no such office, I cannot help weeping
when I read that the preamble was adopted by the senate, gram-
mar, diction, mistake, and all. Still, what better could be expected,
when a grave and reverend senator, in speaking about the World's
Fair, and against opening it on Sundays, declared that no man
"had went" farther than he had in support of that great enter-
prise. I know that as a critic of language, I stand on dangerous
ground, because I never studied rhetoric, and I should not know a
rule of grammar if I met it on the street. I write, as I play the
fiddle, "by ear" ; and judging by the ear alone, I claim that "had
went" is better grammar, and better sense than " chief executive";
and I am willing to submit that claim to the judgment of any
school-teacher in this town. I have said it before, and I say it
again, that a man has no more right to jar the nerves of his neigh-
bors by discords in rhetoric than by discords in music, for there
are men and women whose nerves are finely strung in sympathy
with all the tunes and cadences of pure and classic language. To
them the limpid flow of our literature from Chaucer to Longfellow
is an eloquent melody whose notes may not be rudely jarred, nor
its symphonies destroyed. In justice to the feelings of refined
people, I maintain that a man has no right to say " Chief Execu-
tive," when he means the " President of the United States."
* ^
Among the superstitions common to our people is the delusion
that magic lies in a "diploma," so that if a man can only obtain
that, he becomes qualified for any trade, profession, or calling he
may choose to put his hand to. It will soon be that a man must
have a diploma before he can be permitted to earn an honest liv-
ing at anything. He must pass an examination before he can be a
lawyer, or a doctor or a druggist, or a dentist, or practice this, that,
or the other useful trade. The excuse for all that interference with
our natural rights is, that society at large is interested in skilful
and competent practitioners. Thinking the matter over, I am
wondering whether it would not be well to demand some sort of a
diploma before allowing a man to practice as a statesman, either
in the provinces, or in the National Congress. To be sure, many
practicing statesmen would be found ineligible, but is not ' ' society
at large " as much interested in competent lawmakers as in com-
petent lawyers, or plumbers, or civil engineers ? For instance,
would not a diploma have been found useful in the case of that
eminent statesman who introduced a bill into the legislature, for-
bidding oysters or clams to be sold in bulk in the State of Illinois,
and requiring that they be sold either in the shells or in air-tight
cans ? And in the case of his colleague, who proposes a law de-
claring all persons ineligible to matrimony who cannot show a
certificate that they are able to read and write in their own lan-
guage ? And in the case of that congressman from somewhere, who
proposes to legislate sentiment into the people by act of Congress,
declaring that on and after the thirty-first day of May, 1893, the
pansy shall be our national flower, and that it shall symbolise "jus-
tice, liberty, union, culture, and peace"? Certainly, the pansy is
not a warlike flower, but we have many other flowers that show
more "culture," and just as much "justice, liberty, and union."
Let us require a diploma from all our statesmen before allowing
them to practice. M. M. Trumbull.
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Human Origins. By .V. Laing. London : Chapman & Hall,
Ld. 1892. Fifth Thousand.
Important as are the facts of physical science, as bearing on
the material progress of the human race, it is none the less true.
as stated by the author of the present work, that the most inter-
esting of the results of modern science are those which bear upon
the origin and evolution of the race. It is remarkable within how
short a period this branch of science, which under the title of
Anthropology was not long ago regarded as unorthodox if not
" infidel," has come to occupy a recognised position. This is un-
doubtedly due to the general reception by scientific men of the
doctrine of evolution, under the influence of Darwinism ; and Mr.
Laing does right, therefore, in supporting his contention as to the
vast antiquity of the human race by reference to the requirements
of that doctrine. If it be true, for instance, that all the species of a
genus of apes have sprung from a common ancestor, we must be-
lieve that all the varieties of the human species have also had a
common derivation. Such a conclusion necessitates the throwing
back of the origin of man to a date so distant, that the time which
has since elapsed should be measured in geological periods rather
than in years. Three quite distinct European types of paleolithic
man are known to have existed, and they all appear to be differ-
ent from the Negro type, which in certain particulars approaches
the most nearly to that of the quadrumana. The question of
human origins is complicated by the fact, that although the Cann-
stadt type of skull found in Western Europe may be regarded as
of a somewhat simian character, yet the still earlier skull of Cas-
telredolo and Calaveras in California, which were extracted from
Tertiary strata, are of a less brutal character. This would seem
to require the first appearance of the really human being to have
taken place during the middle Tertiary ; unless we are to suppose
that his structure was originally more plastic than it is at present,
and therefore more subject to variation under the influences of
climate and other conditions. The conclusion arrived at by the
author would seem to be a proper one. It is that man has existed
from the Pliocene and probably from the Miocene period, but that
at the earliest date at which his remains have been found there
were several sharply distinguished types.
It is not surprising, considering the small portion of the
earth's surface that has been examined for human remains, that
the ancestral type of man which constituted the "missing link"
has not yet been discovered. There are certain facts from which
we may infer that the primeval men were of small make, and
traces of them may be expected to be met with, if at all, in regions
now inhabited by dwarf races. Possibly, however, their original
habitat may now be beneath the waters of the great ocean, to be-
come known to science only in some future geological epoch. We
have only to suppose that the continental area was formerly as
extensive in the southern hemisphere as it now is in the northern
hemisphere, and that mankind originated on some portion of that
area which is now submerged, and a solution would be found for
several interesting anthropological problems. The least developed
of the existing varieties of man are all to be met with within the
southern hemisphere or not far from its borders, and the time
which has elapsed since the destruction of its continental system
would probably be sufficient to account for the formation of the
different human types after the spread of mankind from the com-
mon centre. It is indeed possible that the formation of distinct
types may be the result of the long continuance of special geolog-
ical conditions either within different geographical areas, or suc-
cessively within the same area, the former being the most prob-
able.
The great difficulty connected with the assignment to man-
kind of the last antiquity required by the theory of evolution is
the extremely short time covered by the historical period. The
most distant date which can be brought within this period, ac-
cording to the teachings of archaeological inquiry, does not carry
us further back than about 5000 B. C, the approximate date of
the foundation of the Egyptian empire by Menes. The most recent
discoveries in Chaldaea are thought by some authorities to point
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to the existence of Accadian civilisation in that region as early as
6000 B. C, but the more recent date which carries the historical
period more than two thousand years beyond the beginning of the
annals of the Chinese empire, is accepted by the author. He
points out, however, that in Chaldaea as in Egypt, the country
was then in a settled condition, being divided into a number of
small states governed by priest-kings. These were in Egypt the
Horsheshu, or servants of Horns, and to them is ascribed the
building of the most ancient temples, and also of the great
Sphyn.x, which would seem to be much older than the earliest
pyramid of Ghizeh, and is an image of Hormachen, the Son of
the Lower World. These architectural works are evidence of the
existence of a considerable degree of civilisation at the above date,
5000 B. C, although it is quite possible that they may have been
due to an intrusive roll among a pastoral people, and the origin of
civilisation should, therefore, be carried considerably beyond that
epoch.
That at a very early date, historically considered, the Semites
established themselves as a ruling class, not only in Chaldaea, but
also in Egypt, is shown by the monuments, and it is very prob-
able that the earliest Egyptian empire was founded by Semitic
conquerors. As the result of recent researches, it is now known
that Southern Arabia was the seat of an ancient civilisation, com-
parable to that of Egypt or Chaldsea, which probably originated
at as early a date. Indeed, as pointed out by the author, ancient
tradition refers to Southern Arabia as the source of both Chal-
dsean and Phenician civilisation. Moreover, the country named
Punt, which the Egyptians always spoke of with reverence, is sup-
posed to have been Arabia Felis and the adjoining coast of North-
Eastern Africa, now known as Somali-land, and "the physical
type also of the chiefs of Punt, as depicted on the Egyptian monu-
ments, is very like that of the aristocratic type of the earliest known
Egyptian portraits." It is an important fact, as bearing on the
question of human origins, that "in Arabia alone we find Semites
and Semites only," but it ought to have been mentioned that
the South Arabian Semite belongs to a somewhat different type
to the Semite of the North. The former would seem to represent
the pure stock, and his associations are undoubtedly with Africa
rather than with Asia, or at least the central plateau from which
the Turanian people of Chaldaea and Elam appear to have issued.
It should be noticed, moreover, that the traditions of the Chal-
dseans and Phenicians pointed to the Bahrein Islands in the Persian
Gulf, or to the Gulf itself, by which we may understand foreigners
coming by sea, as the source of their civilisation. This would seem
to point to India as its real place of origin, and it is a pity that the
author does not say anything with reference to Hindu civilisation,
or rather to the pre-Hindu civilisation which the Vedas themselves
hint at as existing among the Dravidian peoples. Probably he was
deterred partly by the scantiness of the materials, and partly by a
wish not to intervene in the Aryan controversy. There are reasons
for believing that India and Egypt were at an early date in close com-
munication, and this is supposed in the conjecture that the tin which
enters into the composition of the bronze used for the weapons
and tools of ancient Egypt was brought from Malacca. But even
if the origin of what we call ancient civilisation could be traced to
Southern India, and if it had gradually developed there through a
period of five thousand years, it would be carried back only to
about 10,000 B. C, which is as nothing to the vast antecedent
period in the lifetime of mankind, of which we find trace only in
the few scattered relics met with in caves, and in gravel beds and
other geological strata. These are, however, amply sufiScient to
establish the fact of man's existence on the earth for hundreds of
thousands of years, and there is no reason why an antiquity of a
million years should not be conceded to him, if this is required by
the actual data.
That the ancients had some idea of the great antiquity of the
human race appears, however, from a fact which has not been
allowed its due prominence. Mr. Laing, in referring to Egyptian
chronology, remarks that "before the establishment of such his-
torical dynasties we have nothing but legends and traditions,
which are vague and mythical, the mythological element rapidly
predominating, as we go backwards in time, until we soon arrive
at reigns of gods, and lives of thousands of years. But as we ap-
proach the period of historical dynasties the mythological element
diminishes, and we pass from gods reigning 10,000 years, and
patriarchs living to 900, to later patriarchs living 150 or 200 years,
and finally to mortal men, living, and kings reigning, to natural
ages." In Chaldaea also we have a mythological period, extend-
ing over 432,000 years, during which gods and demi-gods reigned,
and even 259,000 years are said to have elapsed between the in-
troduction of civilisation by Cannes and the Chaldasan deluge.
The chronology of the Hindus introduces similar figures, and the
Buddhists of Central Asia ascribe to the earliest men lives of
marvellous length, giving them in addition enormous size. Now
although such statements as these are purely legendary, yet it is
quite possible that they may preserve some dim memory of the
fact that mankind was not a creature of yesterday, but that he
had existed on the earth for a vast period, of which no record re-
mained except in the daily life of the people, and in the vague
stories of the reigns of gods and demi-gods.
Before bringing to a close this notice of Mr. Laing's excellent
work, reference may be made to a few of its other more striking
features. The origin of the week of seven days is clearly shown,
and the austerity of the Sabbath connected with its associations
as the day ruled over by "the gloomy and malignant" Saturn.
The fact is mentioned that the moon supplied the standard for
measuring time until it was discovered that the seasons are regu-
lated by the sun. It might have been added that the first time
measurers probably dwelt in a region where winter was unknown.
The question of the historical element in the Old Testament is
treated with great fairness, and the results of modern criticism
clearly stated. The author does not, however, throw any new
light on the subject, but his statement that the moral atmosphere
of the history of the Hebrews ' ' continues to be that of Red Indians
down to the time of David " is suggestive. The bearing of Croll's
theory of the action of the precession of the equinoxes, in com-
bination with the eccentricity of the earth's orbit, in the produc-
tion of the glacial period, as restated by Sir R. Ball, is well
treated ; and the conclusion appears to be justified, that " as man
clearly existed in the pre-glacial period, and was already widely
spread and in considerable numbers in the early glacial, 250,000
years may be taken as an approximation to the ininiimim duration
of the existence of the human race on the earth." The final
chapters, which deal with the subject of human origins from what
may be regarded as its more purely anthropological standpoint,
give a clear summary of the evidence in favor of the existence of
Quarternary and Tertiary man. In connection with this subject
we would point out that in "the earliest portrait of a man " found
in the Grotto of Les Eyzies, a stroke which is usually taken for a
horse's leg is very suggestive of a tail for the human being ! In
leaving the work we will say only, that it is excellently adapted
to do what the author desires, to stimulate the minds of the young,
and of the intelligent members of the working classes to study the
subject which he states has been to him " the solace of a long life,
the delight of many quiet days, and the soother of many troubled
ones," and that it is deserving, moreover, of study by all those who
are wishful to know the truth as to human origins. \l.
Precis d'economie politique et de morale. By G. De MoHuari.
Paris : Guillaumin & Co. 1893.
The present work is a neat and well-printed volume of 278
pages. The activity of its veteran author, who is a correspondent
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of the Institute and Editor-in-Chief of the Journal des Economistes,
extends as far back as the year 1846 when he published a small
volume entitled Etudes economiques. The publishers Guillaumin
and Co. have the reputation of publishing excellent works in this
department ; their Collection des frincipntix ecomvnistes and their
Xouveaii diclionnaire d'cconomie folitii/iie being especially note-
worthy. This work, therefore, needs little comment.
The purpose of the book, the author says, is to summarise and
bring within the reach of the general reader the fundamental no-
tions of political economy and the science of ethics, as he conceives
these -sciences to be constituted. The work is divided into three
parts: (i) "The General Economy of Nature," (2) "Political
Economy," (3) " Ethics." All the chapters are instructive.
The law of self-preservation, regulated by the motive force of
pleasure and pain, is, says Molinari, the fundamental law of exist-
ence : it controls man and beast alike. But man has reason and
foresight. The beast destroys, man produces ; he accumulates, he
saves ; he makes the labor of one supply the wants of many and
thus makes it possible for others to follow higher and different
pursuits. On this simple basis the vast structure of civilisation,
with its untold wealth, arises ; and the domain of Political Econ-
omy is created. With economical progress comes the necessity of
Positive Law, the necessity of protection, the necessity of security ;
and beyond positive law, comprising all, ethics, the supreme science
of conduct in all human relations. Though economical in its foun-
dation, human society is ethical in its end ; its raison d'etre is eth-
ical. All laws, all customs, if they are just, are the expression of
our ethical ideas. And our ethical ideas, if they are correct, are
the reflection of the facts of human nature and the conditions of
human existence. These ethical ideas must be the guide and gov-
ernor of the great machine of economical civilisation. Without
ethics, in the expressed form of law, no true economical progress.
The divorce of the two is the cause of the great crisis which now
inpends like a lowering cloud over the modern world.
Such is, briefly and positively expressed, in our own words,
Molinari's view. This is the fundamental fact of his book. Con-
cerning his opinions on technical points of political economy, we
present no criticism : his theories are, as he expressly states, liis
own views of the subject. His style is forcible and clear. His
mode of presentation is concise, and unburdened by platitudes or
redundant discussions. finpK.
An Introduction to the Study of the Constitution. A Study
Showing the Play of Physical and Social Factors in the
Creation of Institutional Law. By Morris M. Colin. Balti-
more : The Johns Hopkins Press. 1892.
America. Its Geographical History—1492-1892. Six ^.ectures
Delivered to Graduate Students of the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, with a supplement entitled "Was the Rio Del Es-
piritu Santo of the Spanish Geographers the Mississipppi ?"
By Z^;-. Walter B. Scaife. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press. 1892.
These two works are volumes XI II and XI of the "extra vol-
ume" series of the Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical
and Political Science—a series conducted under the able manage-
ment of Dr. H. B. Adams. They contain respectively 235 and 176
pages.
Mr. Cohn's work was written, as the author says, "for the
purpose of bringing before the student and reader of our American
constitutional system a mass of information which at present lies
scattered among the productions of many different writers, inquir-
ers, and thinkers." The monograph is not intended for the special
wants of legal practitioners, but is intended to supply the student
with those general doctrines of political science which are abso-
lutely necessary to the understanding of any special form of gov-
ernment. Mr. Cohn has made use of the very best authorities in
the production of this work : he has incorporated into his views
the opinions of leading modern writers concerning the origin of
"law" and "sovereignty," concerning the operation of physical
and social factors in the constitution of states, with all that these
subjects imply.
The philosophy of law and the science of comparative juris-
prudence are studies which until very lately have been much neg-
lected in the United States. Otherwise, one who is ac(iuainted in
the least with the history of institutions and with the idea of the
evolution of things human and divine, might really wonder why
Mr. Cohn should be led to make the remark that "The belief that
the constitution of the United States was one out of many, and
could have no existence save in connection with well settled and
somewhat diversely governed communities which preceded it, early
formed itself in his mind and has now grown into an unalterable
conviction." He also remarks that the repeated expressions of
federal tribunals bear out this conviction. The Anglo American
lawyer hesitates, without the opinion of a court, to pass judgment
even on questions of philosophy.
It does not lie within our province to give a detailed critical
opinion of Mr. Cohn's work but the erudition which is displayed
in the citation of authorities and its appearance in the Johns Hop-
kins series are a sufficient guarantee of its usefulness.
The second of these books is an interesting monograph by Dr.
Scaife on the development of American geography. It is divided
into the following six sections: " The Development of the Atlantic
Coast in the Consciousness of Europe ; " " Development of Pacific
Coast Geography ; " " Geography of the Interior of Polar Regions ; "
"Historical Notes on Certain Geographical Names: America,
Brazil, Canada ; " " Development of American National and State
Boundaries ; " " Geographical Work of the National Government.
"
It contains a number of photographs and facsimile reproduc-
tions of ancient maps of America preserved in the libraries of
Europe and of our own country, and though a treatise on a spe-
cial subject will be of great interest to the general reader. [iKpn.
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